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In the Supreme Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
ARNIE R. GREEN, 
Plaintiff and App~llant, 
-vs.-
THE LANG COMPANY, INC., 
a Corporation, 
LEONARD CHIPMAN LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
JULION CLAWSON, Sr., and 
JULION CLAWSON, Jr., 
Defendants ,and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
7262 
This is a case in which it has been judicially determined 
that the plaintiff, by reason of certain personal injuries, has 
been damaged in the sum of $3,030.00; but the plaintiff is 
seeking to recover for those damag~s the sum of $4280.00. 
The plaintiff brought this action-against the Lang Com, 
pany, Inc., a corporation, Leonard Chipman Livestock 
Company, a corporation, Julian Clawson, Sr., and Julian 
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Clawson, Jr., and in his amended complaint alleged that his 
injuries were due to the carelessness and neglig•ence of the 
defendants as al1eged in paragraph 7 of his said amended 
complaint (R. 14). 
The defendants Leonard Chipman LiVIc8tJock Company 
and the two Clawsons, by answer, denied their own negli-
genoe, but did not deny the negligence of the Lang Company, 
the other defendant, and did not deny that the negligence 
of the Lang Oompany proximaudy caused the injuries to the 
plaintiff. Hence, as between these defendants and the plain-
tiff the11e was no issue as to the negligence of the Lang Com-
pany or as to the fact that such neglig·ence proximately 
caused injuries to the plaintiff. 
On the 7th day of June, 1948, the day before this. case 
came to trial, the plaintiff and the Lang Company entered 
into a covenant not to sue, whe11ein it was recited that 
there had been some claim of liability on the part of the Lang 
Company; that, the11efore, in consideration of the ..sum of 
$1,250, the plaintiff promised and agreed not to sue the 
Lang Oompany on any claim or claims of any description 
for or on acoount of a:ny injuries receiVIed by plaintiff in the 
accident wherein plaintiff was injured by reason of a tire 
and wheel falling off the truck of these defendants. Plain-
tiff expP<3ssly reserved its rights against the defendant Live-
stock Company and the two Clawsons. 
Pursuant to this agreement, the Court entered an order 
dismissing the case as against the Lang Company (R. 34). 
This cause proceeded to trial, with the Lang Company 
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eliminated as a party. At the end of the presentation of 
evidence, the covenant not to sue was submitted in evidence 
by the parties hereto as Exhibit H (R. 114). The Trial 
Court found the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against 
these defendants and found that the plaintiff had been dam, 
aged in the sum of $3,030.00. (See paragraph 9, Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 48). The Trial Court 
further found that the plaintiff had received from the Lang 
Company the sum of $1,250.00 in consideration for which 
plaintiff agreed not tJo sue or prosecute the Lang Company 
for any injuries _received in the accident involved in this 
cause of action. The Court thereupon deducted the 
$1,250.00 so received by the plaintiff and entered judgment 
against the defendants Livestock Company and the two 
Clawsons in the sum of $1780.00. 
The plaintiff in this Court contends that the defendant 
Lang Company and the defendants Livestock Company and 
the two Clawsons were not joint tort feas~ors, that the Lang 
Company was in no way responsible for the injuries suffered 
by the plaintiff, and that, therefore, judgment should be 
entered against the latter defendants for the entire amount 
of plaintiff's damag~zs, and upon some theory left unstated, 
plaintiff is entit1ed to pocket $1,250.00 in addition thereto. 
Plaintiff's statement of the facts of the case is generally 
oorrect and we will make such further statement of facts as 
we deem nzcessary under each of the point·s we rely upon. 
POINTS INVOLVED 
To sustain the judgment as rendered by the Trial Court, 
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the defendants Leonard Chipman Livestock Company, Julion 
Clawson, Sr., and Julion Clawson, Jr., rely upon and pre-
sent in opposition to plaintiff's oont,ention, the following 
propositions: 
I. 
Where an inju11zd person files suit against two or more 
pevsons alleging that their negligence caused his injuries, any 
settlement mcrde by the injured person with one of the de-
£endants will be deducted from the amount of damages suf-
fered by him, even though the defendant released was not 
in fact liable. 
II. 
The pleadings and proof in this case support the finding 
of the Trial Court that the Lang Company was negligent 
and that its negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injuries, and that, hence, it was a joint vort feasor. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
WHERE AN INJURED PERSON FILES SUIT 
AGAINST TWO OR MORE PERSONS ALLEGING 
THAT THEIR NEGLIGENCE CAUSED HIS INJUR· 
IES, ANY SETTLEMENT MADE BY THE INJURED 
PERSON WITH ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS WILL 
BE DEDUCTED FROM THE AMOUNT OF DAM-
AGES SUFFERED BY HIM, EVEN THOUGH THE 
DEFENDANT RELEASED WAS NOT IN FACT 
LIABLE. 
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Plaintiff should be entitled to but one satisfaction for 
the damages suffered by him. A holding contrary to this 
proposition would be inequitable and unju.st and would 
permit an injured person to make money out of any injury 
hz may suffer by fiiling suit or threatening to file suit against 
varkms persons and thereby getting them to pay money for 
injuries suffered, even though there was no liability upon 
their part. 
It is to be noted that it is not a contention of these 
defendants, the Livestock Company and the two Clawsons, 
that the payment of $1,250.00 to the plaintiff by the Lang 
Company discharges these defendants. Their contention is 
that the payment by the Lang Company, which was made 
a party to this suit, is a pro tanvo discharge o£ these de£~nd .. 
ants, who are then liable only for the balance of the damages 
suffered by the plaintiff. There is no discussion of this 
proposition in Appellant's Brief, and \Ve submit that the law 
sustains the proposition h~re asserted by these defendants. 
Section 47.-0.-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides 
as follows: 
""The amount or value of any consideration 
received by the obligee from one or more of several 
obligors, or from one or more of joint or of joint and 
sev~ral obligors, in who1e or in partial satisfaction of 
their obligations shall be credited to the extent of the 
amount received on the obligation by all co.-obligors 
to whom the obligor or obligors giving the consider .. 
ation did not ·stanc.l in the relation of a surety." 
By Section 47 .. 0.-1 the obligor includes a person liable 
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for a tort; obligee includes a person having a right based 
on tort. 
Under this statute no distinction is made between re, 
leases and covenants not to sue. At common law it was 
early held that a discharge of one of two or more joint tort 
fe,as~ors by release effected a discharge of the other joint 
tort fea.stors. To lessen the supposed harshness of this rule 
the courts began holding that where the injured person 
entered into a covenant not to sue with one of two or more 
tor.t feasors., ·such covenant not to sue would not result in 
a release or discharge of the other joint tort feasors. How-
ever, it is wdl •established at common law that payments 
made on account of such injuries, pursuant to the terms of 
a covenant not to sue, are considered as pro tanto satisfaction 
of damages recoverable against the other joint tort feasors. 
(See annotation at 104 A.L.R. 931, the tide of which is 
.. Amount Paid by One Alleged Joint Tort Fetasoor in Consid-
eration of a Covenant not to Sue, as pro ta:n~o Satisfaction 
of Damages Recoverable against Other Joint Tort F.easors." 
45 Am. fur. 677, Release Sec. 4 states the rule as 
follows: 
··An injured person can have but one satisfac-
tion for his injuries; and theretore the amount paid 
by the tort feasor, in whose favor the covenant not to 
:~ 
:~ 
sue was given, will be regarded as satisfaction pro · : 
tanto as to the joint tort feasors." 
See also Daniels v. Celeste, 303 Mass. 148, 21 N. E. 
2d, 1, 128 A.L.R. 682; Laurezi v. Vra.nizan, 25 Cal. 2d 806, 
155 P. 2d 633 (1945); McKenna v. Austin, 134 F. 2d 659 
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( 1943); 4 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 88'5. 
Plaintiff seeks to avoid the application to this case of the 
foregoing statute, and authorities, by a contention that the 
Lang Company was in fact not liable to plaintiff at any time, 
although p1aintiff alleged under oath that the Lang Company 
was liable for such injuries, and although based upon that 
claim of liability, plaintiff pocketed the sum of $1,2'50.00 
paid to him by the Lang Company. 
The courts have not looked with favor upon such 0011' 
tention, and in over,ruling \Such contention, have asserted 
that an injured person is entitled to but one satisfaction; 
that it would be inequitable for a person to receive for his 
injuries more compensation than the damages suffered, and 
that such injured person will be estopped from asserting that 
a person who paid him compensation for injuries was not in 
fact liable therefor. 
In Jacobsen v. WoeTner, 149 Kan. '598, 89 P. 2d 24 
(1939), plaintiff- brought an action for personal injuries. 
Plaintiff was a passenger in a bus of the Cardinal Stage 
Lines. Defendant's truck was moving on the same ·sighway 
as the bus, in the opposite direction, and in passing another 
car went on to the left side of the highway, striking the 
Stage Lines bus and injuring plaintiff. The plaintiff, in con-
sideration of $2'50.00 paid by the Stage Lines, entered into 
a covenant not to sue the Stage Lines. The covenant pro-
vided that the Stage Lines den!ed any negligence, and that 
it wa·s desired by the parties to avoid litigation and the 
expenses thereof, and that they desincd to set at rest the 
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differences between them. Plaintiff saved all rights against :~ 
all others. ~~ 
The jury found that the Stage Lines was not guilty >m 
of negligence. The verdict was for the plaintiff against the :~J 
defendant, and the trial oourt refused oo allow any reduction ~, 
for the amount paid to plaintiff under the covenant not to W:a 
sue. This was held error. ~& 
The oourt stated that an injured party could receive :w1 
but one •satisfaction for the same injury; that a release of one 1 
joint tJort feasor releases all, and that a covenant not to sue 
one joint tort feasor does not release ·others. 
After quoting from a number of cases, the Kansas 
Supreme Court concludes: 
""Whzn a right of action is once satisfied, it 
ceases to exist. If part satisfaction has already been 
obtained, further recovery can only be had of a sum 
sufficient to accomplish satisfaction. It is not neoes-
sary that the party making payment in partial satis-
faction was in fact liable; anything received on 
account of the injury inuv~s to the benefit of all and 
operates as a payment pro tanto. The plaintiff is 
entitled to only one satisfaction from whatev•er source 
it may oome." 
The court remanded the case with instructions to deduct 
the $2 50.00 from the judgment 1entered. 
Another leading case on this subject is the case of 
T omp~ins v. Clay-street Hill R. Co., 66 Cal. 163, 4 P. 1165 
( 1884) . In that case plaintiff commenced an action for 
personal injuries resulting from a collision of the cars of the 
Clay-street Hill Company and th2 Sutter-,street Company, 
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plaintiff being a passenger on the Sutter car. The complaint 
alleged that both companies were negligent. The Sutter 
Company paid the plaintiff and received a 11elease. The 
Trial Court instructed the jury that if both companies w·ere 
jointly at fault, then the verdict must be for the defendant, 
because the payment to the Sutt>zr Company would release 
the defendant Company; but that if only the defendant Com .. 
pany was at fault, then the verdict must be for the plaintiff. 
This instruction was held to be erlior and the Court stated: 
""It is urged by counsel for appellee that the 
rule only applies where the money is paid by, or the 
release executed to, one who is himself actually guilty 
of the wrong or negligence. If it be oonceded that 
a release to, or receipt of money in alleged satisfac .. 
tion from, one not himself a trespasser, will not 
discharge those actually guilty, the question still 
remains: Oan the plaintiff, under the circumstances, 
be permitted ro deny that the Sutt>cr--street Railroad 
Company was guilty of negligence directly contrib-
uting to the injuries by her received? ~eading the 
release and stipulation in the 1.1coord, it is plain the 
$550.00 was paid in settlement of the action pend.-
ing, in ·so far as the cause of action alleged oonsti.-
tuted a claim against the Sutter.-street Company. 
The compromise of an asserozd claim does not neces.-
sarily involve an admission on the part of him against 
whom the claim is asserted that the claim is well 
founded. But one who, having commenced an action 
against another, has receiv·ed money in consideration 
that the action ·shall bz dismissed, or that any judg.-
ment he may recover shall not be enforced, ought not 
to be permitted to deny that he received the money 
in satisfaction of a valid demand. The defendant 
paying the money may subsequently say: "I did not 
and do not admit that I ought to have paid anything; 
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I was willing to buy my peace.' But the other party 
ought not to be allowed to deny that he had any 
right to the money, the payment of which he had 
induo:d under pain of the prosecution of an action 
al11zady commenced. He should not be permitted to 
say, with any beneficial result to himself, "I pursued 
the defendant falso clamore, and I took his money by 
way of settlement of a pending action in which I 
never oould have recovered.' Shall it be said that 
plaintiff has not 11:ceived compensation for the in-
juries she sustained, because she did not choose affirm-
atively to prove that the negligence of the party from 
whom she received the money contributed to the 
injuries? The plaintiff must be held to have received 
from the Sutter-street Compa:ny satisfaction for the 
very same injuries for which she obtained a judgment 
against the appellant." 
A later California c~se considered this same proposition, 
Hawber v. Raley, 92 Cal App. 701, 268 P. 943 (1928). 
In that case the plaintiff was in jured in an automobile colli-
sion. She was riding in a:n auto owned by Mrs. Emery and 
driven by Mr. Emery. The other automobiLe was owned 
by the defendant and was driven by his son. The plaintiff, 
in consideration of $380.27, released Mrs. Emery. The 
agreement provided that it was not to be construed as an 
admi,ssion of liability by Mrs. Emery. The jury found that 
the negligence of neither Mr. nor Mrs. Emery proximately 
caused the negligence. The plaintiff contended that because 
of this finding the ru1z as to release of one joint tort f.eas-or 
was not applicable. The Court held that it was immaterial 
that the Emerys were not liable and stated: 
""Upon .this latter question the authorities are 
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apparently not agreed, but, whatever may be the law 
elsewhere, the rule seems tJo obtain in this state that 
irrespective of the source from whom the compensa .. 
tion for the injury is accepted, the payment will 
operate as a satisfaction, which in equity and good 
conscience does not permit the party so compensated 
to recover again for the same injury, the ground of 
the rule being that the validity of the release is in no 
way dependent upon the validity of the claim, and 
therefore it is immaterial whether the pel!Son from 
whom satisfaction came was or was not legally liable 
* * * ; nor does it make any di:ffizrence however 
small the compensation thus paid may have been 
* * * . The bar arises not from· any particular 
form that the proceeding assumes, but from the fact 
that the injured party has actually received satisfac .. 
tion or what the law deems is the equivalent." 
The Court further stated: 
.. * * '* the application of the rule is based 
upon the fundamental fact that, where there is a 
single injury, there is but one cause of action, indi .. 
visible and inseparab1e, for which both in law and 
good con~cience there can be but one •satisfaction. ,, 
Later California cases have 11ecognized and followed 
the same rule. See Drumm v. Hart, 136 Cal. App. 12, 27 
P. 2d 945' (1933); Bkzc~burn v. McCoy, 1 Cal. App. 2d 
64,37 P. 2d 15'3 (1934); Leff v. Knewbow, 47 Cal. App. 
2d 360, 117 P. 2d 922 ( 1941). 
In Snyder v. Mutual 'T e~ephone Company 135' Iowa 215' 
112 N.W. 776, 14 L.R.A (N.S.) 321 (1907), plaintiff's 
decedent was killed by coming in contact with a wire charged 
with eLectricity. Plaintiff accepted $1,200.00 from the Des 
Moines Electric Light Company in full settlement of any 
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claim against that Company; she then filed suit against the 
defendant Telephone Company. The jury was instructed 
that if the Light Company and the defendant were joint 
wrong doers, then their verdict must be for the defendant; 
but that if the Light Company was not a wrong doer, then 
the verdict must be for the plaintiff. The verdict was ren-
dered in favor of the plaintiff and on oppeal the foregoing 
instruction was held err;oneous. The Court stated: 
""The vice of this instruction is that it requires 
the defendant to show as an affirmative fact, in order 
to sustain the settlement pleaded by it, that the light 
company was, as a matter of law a:nd fact, liable for 
the injury. In other words, it requires the defendant 
to make out against the light oompany just such a 
cause of action as plaintiff would have been required 
to make out if she had sued the light oompany for 
the injury. Clearly this is not the law. The question 
is whether the plaintiff had received satisfaction from 
another of a claim for the same wrong-whether the 
injury to the plaintiff has been satisfied. She should 
not have two satisfactions. To sustain the rule an-
nounced by the instruction, it would be necessary to 
hold that, although the plaintiff had sued the light 
company and recove11ed judgment against it, which 
judgment had been satisfied, she oould then have 
sued this defendant and recovered another satisfac-
tion if the jury in the second case had found that, 
notwithstanding the judgm,ent against the light com-
pany, it wa:s, as a matter of fact, not liable for the 
injury, for a judgment against one party is of no 
binding effect in an action against another. This 
question is practically determined by what is said in 
Miller v. Bee~, 108 Iowa, 575, 582, 79 N.W. 344, 
346, where this language is used: "As we have szen, 
it is entirely immat•erial that the one from whom sat-
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isfaction was demanded and received was not liable 
for the entire damage. * * * A 'Satisfaction, how, 
ever, by whomsoever made, if accepted as such, is 
a bar to further proceedings on the same cause of 
action., Whether or not this langugae was dictum 
in the case in which it was used need not now be 
discussed, for it is, \ve think, a sound statement ~f 
the law." 
In Seither v. Philadelphia 'Traction ·Company, 125 Pa. 
St. 397, 17 A. 338, 11 Am. St. Rep. 905 (1889}, the 
plaintiff was injured while riding in a car of the Peoples 
Passenger Railway Company which collided with a car of 
the defendant Traction Company. Plaintiff sued both com, 
panies but settled with the Peoples Company for $6,000.00, 
dismissing thz action against that Company, and plaintiff 
then sought to recover for her injuries against the defendant 
Traction Company. 
The plaintiff contended that the Peoples Company was 
not liable and therefore this release should have no affect 
upon the liability of the def·endant Traction Company. 
The Court said: 
""The plaintiff had received one satisfaction; he 
was not entitled to a second. In his suit against the 
carrying company, the plaintiff could only hav'e re~ 
covered a verdict by showing that the collision was 
caused by its negligence, in other words, that the 
Peoples Company, and not the Traction Company, 
was in fault. In the opening sentenoe of the printed 
argum,ent in this case we find the following: "The 
evidence offered by the plaintiff proves that while 
riding in a car of the Pooples Company he was in~ 
jul\~d by a collision due entirely to the negligence of 
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the Traction Cbmpany, thz carrying company and 
its agents being absolutely without fault. At the 
time this paragraph was written, the plaintiff had in 
his pocket the sum of $6,000.00 which he had re-
ceived from the Company which he now says was 
"absolutely without fault.' A case so unique as this :~ 
might be supposed to stand alonz in the books." 
In Leddy v. Barney, 139 Mass. 394, 2 N.E. 107, the 
plaintiff made a contention similar to that made in the case 
at Bar, and the Court stated: 
""The rule that a release of a cause of action to 
one of several persons liable operates as a release to 
all, applies to a relea·sz giv•en to one .against whom a 
claim is made, although he may not be in fact liable. 
The validity and effect of a release of a cause of 
action does not depend on the validity of the cause 
of action. If a claim is made against on~ and released, 
all who may be liable are discharged, whether the 
one released was liable or not." 
In Young v. Ande'rson, 33 Id. 522, 196 P. 193, 50 
A.L.R. 105 6, the defendant rented a horse and buggy from 
the plaintiff. The horse and buggy was damaged and the 
defendant injured when the horse apparently ran away upon 
the approach of a car belonging to the Brosz Valley Traction 
Company. Plaintiff sued to recover rent for the horse and 
buggy and for damages while it was in the possession of the 
defendant. The defendant counter--claimed for injudzs al-
leged to have resulted from a breach of warranty, that the 
horse was gentle. It appeared during the trial that the d:::-
fendant had released the Traction Company £or injuries 
received in oonsideration of $50.00. The Court held that 
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the Boise Valley Traction Company was not in any sense 
a joint tort f.easor and that the release was not a bar to the 
counter claim of the defendant; but the Court did hold that 
the payment of the $50.00 was admissible in evidence, and 
in that connection stated: 
"Since, however, appellant was only entitled 
to receive compensation for his injuries received, the 
consideration received from the Boise Valley Trac .. 
tion Company for the release of any claim against 
it operated to reduce pro tanto the amount of any 
damages he was entitLed ro recover against any other 
tort feasor responsible for his injuries, and this is 
true whether the tort feas.ors be joint or independent. 
The release, therefore, was admissible in evidence.·,, 
In Harris v. ·City of Roano~e, 179 Va. 1, 18 S.E. 2d 
30 3 ( 194 2), the plaintiff slipped on a substance on the street 
and was injured. She demanded oompensation from a con .. 
tractor who was doing work at that point, the owner of the 
building in front of which plaintiff •slipped and the lessees 
thereof, and the city. She released all but the city for 
$135.00. Plaintiff in that case asserted that the ones re .. 
leased were not joint tort feasors with the defendant city 
a:nd therefore the city could not be released. The Court 
over.-ruled this oontention and stated: 
"It would be highly inequitable for the plaintiff 
to be hzard to assert that the contracting firm and the 
s city were not joint tort feasors when her position, in 
re~ vie\V of the Pzlease, has been just the opposite.,, 
~l In Cleveland etc. Ry. Co. v. Hilligoss, 171 Ind. 417, 
86 N.E. 48 5, 131 Am. St. &ep. 2 58 ( 1908), the plaintiff 
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was a motorman of a street car which collided with a rail-
road car of the def1endant The defendant pleaded a release 
from the street car company, signed by the defendant, re-
leasing the street car company from all claims and demands 
of the plaintiff arising out of the accident. The plaintiff 
contended that the pleading setting forth this defense shows 
that the street car company was not a joint tort feasor and 
was not liable and does not show that a demand was made 
for damages by the plaintiff against the street car company 
and therefore this release had no effect upon defendant\s 
liability. In over-ruling this contention, the Court said: 
""With reference to the releasor and releasee, it 
may be said that the Courts will not permit one 
suffering a wrong to profit by the fears of those 
occupying positions subjecting them to the suspicion 
of being wrong-doer·s, and who are willing to buy 
their peaoe rather than run a risk at law. One who 
compromises a claim does not necessarily admit that 
the claim was well founded, but the one who re-
ceives the consideration is precluded from denying 
that it was. So it may be said that when a pretended 
claim for a tort has been settled by treaty, and satis-
faction rendered the claimant by one so connected 
with the trespass as to be reasonably subject to an 
action and possible liability as a joint tort feasor, the 
satisfaction rendered will release all who may be 
liable, whether the one released was liable or not. In 
such a case it is not necessary that it should appear 
that the party making the settLement was in fact 
liable. It will be deemed ·sufficient if there is an 
appearance of liability; that is, something in the na-
ture of a claim on the one hand and a possible liability 
under the ru~~es of law on the other." 
, .. 
··" 
~~ 
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Under the rule annoWlced by the latter court, there 
must be some appearance or possibility of liability on the 
part of the person paying the injured party before paym,ent 
by him will affect . the liability of others responsible for the 
m: injuries. But in the case at bar this requirement is satisfied. 
[; Plaintiff filed suit against Lang Company and the other de, 
fendants alleging that the negligence of all defendants caused 
plaintiff's injuries. Lang Company demurred to plaintiff's 
·· Amended Complaint (R. 19, 20). This Demurrer was 
·- overruled (R. 23). The trial court thereby 4eld that plain, 
tiff had stated a cause of act~on against Lang Company. 
Thi<S gave an appearance of liability and also indicated a 
possibility of liability. In fact, there was such appearance 
and possibility of liability that Lang Company was willing 
to pay a substantial sum, $1,250.00, to settle the case. On 
this matter of liability, see the discussion under Point II. of 
this brief. 
Other cCl!ses which support this contentiol) of these de, 
fendants are Hubbard v. Railroad Oo., 173 Mo. 249, 72 
S.W. 1073; Hartigan v. Dic~son, 81 Minn. 284, 83 
N.W. 1091. 
We submit that under the for·egoing authorities the 
$1,250.00 receiVted by plaintiff from Lang Company must 
be deducted from the total damages suffered by him, regard, 
less of whether or not the Lang Company was in fact liable 
for his injuries. 
PoiNT II. 
THE PLEADINGS AND PROOF IN THIS CASE 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
THAT THE LANG COMPANY WAS NEGLIGENT 
AND THAT ITS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXI-
MATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES, AND 
THAT, HENCE, IT WAS A JOINT TOR'T FEASOR. 
Plaintiff contends that the Lang Company could not be 
liable for plaintiff's injuries, and is not a joint tort feasor, 
because of the following reasons: 
1. The employees of the Lang Company in loading 
the truck were acting outside of the scope of their employ-
ment and heno~ Lang Company cannot be held responsible 
for their acts of commission or omission. 
2. That Lang Company or its employees were not 
negligent. 
3. That if Lang Company was negligent, such negli-
gence was not the pr;oximate cause of plaintiff's injurie~S, 
because such n~gligenoe was only a remote cause and the 
negligence of the defendant Livestock Company was an 
intervening cause. 
Plaintiff contends that the findings of the trial court, 
contrary to· such contentions, are not supported by the 
reoord. The obvious answ~r to these contentions is that 
they are absolutely at variance with plaintiff's own pleadings 
and the court, s findings are supported by the admitted or 
undenied allegations in plaintiff's Amended Complaint. 
Plaintiff alleged that Lang Company loaded the truck 
and plao~d the wheel between the casings and cab of the 
truck (R.13, 14). ThisthedefendantsLivcstockCompany 
. :r~ 
1\ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
and Clawsons admitted (R. 25). Under this state of the 
pleadings the trial court could not find that the employees 
of La:ng Company were not acting within the soope of their 
employment. It was an admittzd fact that Lang Company 
loaded the truck and placed the wheel thereon as alleged. 
It was admitted by the pleadings that the wheel fell 
from the truck and struck the plaintiff (R. 14, 2 5). 
The plaintiff alleged: 
""That the falling of said wheel was due to the 
carelessness and negligence of the defendants in this: 
(a) That the said defendant Lang Company care-
lessly and negligently fail~zd to fasten said tire or 
secure the same when it loaded the same onto said 
truck and carelessly and negligently failed to secure 
said wheel in any manner whatsoever, then and there 
well knowing that said wheel, by reason of not being 
fastened or attached or secured in some manner, 
would fall from ·said truck." (R. 14, 15). 
The foregoing allegations were not denied by the de ... 
fendants Livestock Company and the two Clawsons (R. 25). 
Hence the negligence of the Lang Company and the 
"fact that such negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injuries was not a controverted issue in the case. These 
matters were alleged as true by plaintiff and w•ere oonoeded 
by the defendants and the trial court found in accordance 
with those pleadings. 
We submit that plaintiff can not now claim that the 
c~urt's findings are unsupported by the record. 
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Th~ only case cited by plaintiff which is in any way 
comparable to the case at bar is the case of &u.ghn v. Platt, 
123 Texas 486, 72 S.W. 2d 580. In that case the court 
stated: 
'"In other words, w~ think it cannot be said that 
the servant of the loz Company ought to have antici-
pated or foreseen that his act would result in plain-
tiff's injuries., 
However, in the case at bar, plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant Lang Company knew that. said wheel, by p;::ason 
of not being fastened or attached or secured in some manner, 
would fall from the truck (quotation ·supra) . The trial 
court so found (Finding No. 4, R. 47). 
In the case at bar there are the additlional facts that the 
Lang Company improperly loaded the truck in the first 
instance and it then became necessary to return and have it 
reloaded. Certainly from this it is obvious that the truck 
was to be again taken out an the highway, and in loading 
the wheel without fastening or securing it in some way, 
it is reasonable to hold that the person loading it is charge· 
able with anticipating that the tire would fall from the truck 
(l)S it proo~eded along the highway. That negligence of 
Lang Company cannot be eliminated as a causative factor 
in this case. That the negligence of Clawson concurred in 
plaintiff's injuries does not eliminate this negligence. The 
negligence of Clawson cannot bz classed as unrelated. The 
tire fell from the truck and where it was not in any way 
fastened that fall could be anticipated by the loader. 
Plaintiff's contention that the negligence of the de-
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that the defendants in this case a11e joint tort j.eas1ors and that 
the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for only $1,780.00 against 
the defendants _Livestock Company and the two Clawsons, 
that amount, plus the $1,250 paid to him by Lang Company 
being full compensation to hiin for the damages he has suf-
fered by 11eason of his injuries. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERTS & ROBERTS 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents Leonard 
Chipman Livestock 
Company, JulionQlaw-
son, Sr., Julian Claw-
son, Jr. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
